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Of Persons and the Criminal Law: (Second
Tier) Personhood as a Prerequisite
for Victimhood
Luis E. Chiesa*
Michael Vick's Dogs and Beyond
We recently witnessed one of the most (in)famous trials of
the present decade-the case of Michael Vick. In 2007, federal
authorities publicly unveiled the gruesome details of the football superstar's involvement in dog-fighting. As it turns out,
Vick had a penchant for gambling and an infatuation for breeding pit bulls for animal fighting competitions. This infelicitous
combination led him to establish a dog-fighting ring in Smithfield, Virginia. The operation, which came to be known as the
"Bad Newz Kennels" business venture, was an intricate one.
The pit bulls were bred to fight, trained to kill, and slaughtered
if they performed poorly during test fighting sessions.1 Faced
with an overwhelming amount of evidence against him and
with the prospect of having two of his "Bad Newz Kennels" associates incriminate him, Vick eventually pled guilty in Federal
Court to one count of conspiracy to sponsoring dogs in an
2
animal fighting venture.
What is telling about the Vick case, and of particular interest for the purposes of this article, is the peculiar treatment
that was afforded to the pit bulls that the police seized from the
Smithfield property. Whereas pit bulls seized from unlawful
fighting operations are usually euthanized after they are in the
custody of the government, Vick's dogs were given a second
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I am indebted to David Cassuto for his valuable suggestions and comments.
1. Summary of the Facts, United States v. Michael Vick, Criminal No.
3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/photo/
2007/0824ivicksummary.pdf.
2. Vick's conduct constituted a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
See Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael Vick, Criminal No. 3:07CR274,

2

(E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/photo/2007/0824/
vickplea.pdf.
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chance at life and were sent to animal rescue organizations in
order to be cared for and rehabilitated. 3 Furthermore, the NFL
star agreed in the plea deal to "make restitution for the full
amount of the costs associated with the disposition of all dogs"
that were involved in his illegal operation. 4 It was specified
that these expenses were to encompass, but were not limited to,
"all costs associated with the care of the dogs involved in that
case, including, if necessary, the long-term care and/or the humane euthanasia of some or all of those animals." 5 Vick ended
up paying close to one million dollars to fund the various entities that have assumed custody of the pit bulls. 6 According to
the agreement, the authority to order such payments stems
from 18 U.S.C. § 3663, which allows for the issuance of orders of
restitution to victims or other persons harmed by the commis7
sion of the offense.
The trial of Michael Vick illustrates how our current criminal laws increasingly treat nonhuman creatures as "victims,"
with all of the consequences that this entails, including the possibility to order that restitution be paid to the animals. In light
of these considerations, it is fair to say that from a purely descriptive point of view, nonhuman creatures can qualify for victimhood. This does not mean, however, that this conclusion is
normatively appealing. Some have argued that this approach is
profoundly misguided, given that the criminal law should only
aim to safeguard the rights of humans.8
In this article it will be contended that this position is
flawed because it is grounded on an artificial definition of personhood that mistakenly makes humanhood the constitutive
feature of personhood. Although there may be good reasons for
considering that an entity's humanhood should entitle her to
more protection from the legal system than nonhuman beings,
it does not follow that the lack of such a status should preclude
3. Juliet Macur, Given Reprieve, N.F.L. Star's Dogs Find Kindness, N.Y.
Feb. 2, 2008, at Al, availableat 2008 WLNR 1991314.
4. Plea Agreement, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Id.
6. ESPN News Services, Jailed Quarterback to Pay for Care of Seized Pit
Bulls, Nov. 28, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3133102.
7. Plea Agreement, supra note 2, at $ 8. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000).
8. See MARKUs DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE
OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).
TIMES,
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access to the protection of the criminal law. The argument will
proceed in four parts.
In Part I, I will attempt to define the contours of personhood. This is a particularly difficult task, for the meaning of
this concept is notoriously ambiguous. Because of the polysemic
nature of the term, its discussion frequently invites confusion,
particularly in legal circles. It is not always clear whether it is
meant to be used as an alternative to "humanhood,"9 as a concept that treats humanhood as a necessary but insufficient condition for personhood, 10 or as a legal term that may encompass
beings or entities that are not members of the human race."
The problem is compounded by the fact that courts and
commentators have frequently appealed to artificial definitions
of personhood in order to answer complex normative questions
about the rights and obligations of certain creatures. Thus, it
has often been stated that whether an entity has constitutional
rights depends on whether it can be defined as a "person" according to conventional and historical applications of the term.12
This is a mistake, for one should not tackle such fundamental
questions by appealing to terminological sleights of hand. Ultimately, a being should be considered a person if there are good
normative reasons for recognizing that he should be a bearer of
rights and obligations, not the other way around. Therefore, as
long as many of the statutory and constitutional provisions that
confer rights and impose obligations are couched in the language of personhood, we should elaborate conceptions of per-

9. Many penal codes define "person" in a way that is synonymous with
"human being." See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05(1) (McKinney 2004).
10. See DUBBER, supra note 8, at 259 ("All persons are humans, but not all
humans are persons.").
11. This appears to be the constitutional meaning of "person," for the Supreme Court treats corporations as "persons" in the constitutional sense although
they are certainly not human beings. See, e.g., Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203
U.S. 243 (1906).
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-62 (1973), for the Supreme Court's

analysis of the historical use of the term "person" in order to conclude that fetuses
should not be afforded personhood status. The lack of any substantive arguments

that might support the Court's historically based definition of fetuses as non-persons is particularly surprising.
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sonhood by appealing to normative rather than definitional

considerations. 13
In Part II, I will take issue with what will be called the "all
or nothing" theory of personhood. According to this theory, a
being is either a full-fledged person or not a person at all. This
conception of personhood is normatively unappealing, for it is
plausible, and sometimes desirable, to talk about "partial personhood" alongside with "full-blown personhood." This is what I
call the "tiered" theory of personhood, which holds that "personhood" is a concept that admits of degrees and shades of gray.
According to this theory, beings should be considered "fullfledged" persons if they should be the bearers of all of the rights
and obligations that our legal system has to offer. Contrarily,
they should be considered "partial" persons if they should only
have the privilege to enjoy some of the rights that our constitutional and statutory provisions confer to persons. The tiered
theory of personhood is normatively appealing, for we sometimes have good reasons to legally discriminate between beings
on the basis of their different constitutive features.
In Part III, I will propose four different "tiers" or "levels" of
personhood. The first tier of personhood is reserved for born
humans and animals that are capable of rationality and selfconsciousness, such as chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas.
The second tier is comprised of sentient fetuses and nonhuman
animals not falling within the scope of the first tier. The third
tier encompasses living non-sentient beings, such as fetuses
that do not have the capacity to feel, embryos and trees and
plants. Finally, the fourth tier of personhood includes all nonliving entities that should be afforded rights in order to further
human interests. The chief example of a fourth tier person is a
corporation.

13. Another option might be abandoning the language of personhood altogether. As Professor David Cassuto has recently argued, the term "person" carries
with it so much baggage and is so inherently vague that it might be better to discontinue its use. David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat: The Cultural Foundation of the
Factory Farm, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 82-85 (2007). While I am sympathetic to this view, I believe that as long as most constitutional and statutory provisions continue to afford rights to "persons," we unfortunately cannot avoid
making reference to personhood as a vehicle for establishing the legal rights of
different beings.

2008]

OF PERSONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

763

In Part IV, I will argue that the fact that certain beings are
not born humans should not be an impediment to treating them
as victims and as (partial) persons. Since sentient animals and
fetuses have the capacity to feel pain, they should have a right
to be kept free from the unjustifiable infliction of suffering. If
so, it would be sensible to attempt to safeguard such rights by
making use of the criminal sanction. Therefore, I will conclude
that victimhood depends on second tier personhood rather than
humanhood.
I.

A.

Distinguishing Humanhood from Personhood: Of
Definitional Stops and Inherently Hazy Concepts

Colloquial vs. Legal Meanings of Humanhood and
Personhood

Many people colloquially use the terms "human" and "person" interchangeably. Although at an informal conversational
level the conflation of these term is not particularly problematic, things change dramatically when we move into the legal
arena. Several of the most sacred provisions of our Bill of
Rights afford rights to "persons." Thus, the Fifth Amendment
states that "no person" shall be tried twice for the same offense,
"compelled ...to be a witness against himself' or "deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." 14 Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment asserts that no "person"shall be
15
denied "the equal protection of the laws."
At first glance, one might be tempted to conclude that personhood means in the constitutional context the same thing
that it means at the colloquial level: humanhood. This, of
course, as the landmark Supreme Court decision of County of
Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company16 demonstrates, is far from clear. As far as the highest court of the land
is concerned, the term "person" is not synonymous with
"human," for non-corporeal entities such as corporations are
considered persons for the purposes of most, if not all, of consti14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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tutional provisions. 17 Some have argued that such an interpretation is mistaken and that personhood should be equated with
humanhood.18 Others have claimed that the law has not gone
far enough and thus propose that nonhuman animals also be
considered persons under the law in much the same way as
humans are. 19
Regardless of what one thinks about these questions, appealing to an a priori definition of "personhood" will not help us
much when answering the question with regards to whether
nonhuman entities should be considered persons for legal purposes. The reason for this is that there is simply no conventional agreement about the specific set of stable attributes that
a given entity must exhibit in order for it to qualify as a person.
Furthermore, there is widespread disagreement amongst philosophers, scientists, theologians and lawyers regarding the criteria that should be taken into account to determine whether a
being counts as a person or not. Therefore, personhood is an
imprecise criterial concept. Criterial concepts are imprecise
when, because of the very nature of the concept, it is impossible
for us to agree on the necessary and sufficient conditions that
set forth the criteria for the correct application and use of the
20
term or phrase.
The inherently hazy nature of personhood is particularly
apparent when one examines the widely divergent definitions of
the term that have been advanced by scholars from different
fields. The philosopher Peter Singer, for example, has argued
that there is no necessary connection between personhood and
humanhood. Thus, in his much celebrated book PRACTICAL ETHics, he stated that:
This use of 'person' is itself, unfortunately, liable to mislead,
since 'person' is often used as if it meant the same as 'human being.' Yet the terms are not equivalent; there could be a person
who is not a member of our species. There could also be members
of our species who are not persons. The word 'person' has its ori17. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporationsand the

Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990).
18. See id.
19. See Gary Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism:Relative
Normative Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. REV. 75, 83-87 (1997).
20. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 9 (2006).
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gin in the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in classical
drama. By putting on masks the actors signified that they were
acting a role. Subsequently 'person' came to mean one who plays
a role in life, one who is an agent. According to the Oxford Dictionary, one of the current meanings of the term is 'a self conscious rational being.' This sense has impeccable philosophical
precedents .... I propose to use 'person,' in the sense of a rational
and self-conscious being, to capture those elements of the popular
sense of 'human being' 21that are not covered by 'members of the
species 'Homo sapiens.'
Many, of course, disagree with Singer's definition of "person" as a "self-conscious rational being," for it leads to excluding
many infants and some humans with brain damage from the
definition of "person." This is particularly the case with theologians, who, for the most part, consider that humanhood is a nec22
essary and sufficient condition for personhood.
Courts and legal scholars have also put forth diverse definitions of personhood. Some courts, for example, have stated that
the meaning of (legal) personhood should not be ascertained by
appealing to biological data. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals once asserted that, as far as personhood is concerned, "[i]t
is not true, however, that the legal order necessarily corresponds to the natural order."23 Contrarily, some scholars, such
as Markus Dubber, have contended that "[a]ll persons are
humans but not all humans are persons." 24 For him, a being
should only be considered a person if, in addition to being
25
human, he possesses capacity for autonomy.
These discrepancies in the way in which different people
define personhood reveal that there is no widely agreed upon
set of criteria that must be satisfied in order for a being to qualify as a person. Furthermore, it shows that there is disagreement with regards to whether humanhood should be considered
a prerequisite for personhood. As a result, it appears that there
21. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETIcs 87 (2d ed. 1993).
22. See Peter Kreeft, Human PersonhoodBegins at Conception, 4 J. BIBLICAL
ETHics MED. 9 (1997), available at http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/abortion/abOO04.html.
23. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y.
1972).
24. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 259.
25. Id.
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is no necessary conceptual connection between the terms
"human" and "person."
In light of the inherently vague nature of the concept, the
question about who should count as a person is an open one.
Therefore, scholars are free to argue, as they frequently have,
that certain nonhuman entities should be treated as persons
under the law. More importantly, since personhood is an imprecise criterial concept, the soundness of their arguments
should be measured by their normative appeal rather than by
their compatibility with an artificial definition of "person." Ultimately, as Peter Singer has persuasively argued, questions
about personhood and the rights that should be conferred to different entities raise "substantive issue[s], the answer[s] to
which cannot depend on a stipulation about how we shall use
words."

B.

26

Personhood and Rights: Beyond Humanhood

Since there is no clear-cut set of conventionally agreed upon
attributes that one can appeal to in order to determine whether
a being should be considered a "person" under the law, it follows
that such questions are moral or evaluative questions, not conceptual or definitional ones. Thus, the determinative inquiry in
such cases should be whether the being at issue should have
rights rather than whether he should be considered a member
of the human species, as philosopher Roslyn Weiss has convincingly argued:
Considerations regarding the definition and application of
the term 'human' are not essential in themselves, but as a means
to a further end; the end is plainly the ascription of rights ....
Once the appeal to the definition of humanity is revealed as a concern about rights, the following natural, logical, inescapable question arises: If it is rights we are after, why seek definitions of
humanity? Unless there is some necessary connection between
being Homo Sapiens and having rights, it is far more productive
... to tackle directly this question: What sort of thing has rights?
This is a moral question-not a question of biological fact-and
hence far more appropriate in this context. For ... differences in
species are not in themselves morally relevant differences, and
since what we seek is a morally relevant difference, our distinc26.

SINGER,

supra note 21, at 87.
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tion must be drawn not between "humans" and "nonhumans" but
and entities that do not,
rather between entities that have rights
27
between "persons" and "nonpersons."
The interrelationship between rights and personhood
reveals that, as far as the realms of legal and moral theory are
concerned, the term "person" is a purely normative concept that
is free of all biological or descriptive content. 28 Thus, for all legal purposes, saying that someone is a "person" is equivalent to
claiming that such a being has rights under the law. 29 This conception, however, does not entail, as the case of corporations
demonstrates, that only human beings qualify for personhood.
One may, of course, advance arguments against the proposition
that nonhuman entities such as corporations should be considered legal persons. Nevertheless, the soundness of such arguments is to be gauged by their normative appeal rather than by
their ability to capture the conceptual or definitional essence of
"personhood."
II.
A.

Towards a Tiered Theory of Personhood

The "All or Nothing" Theory of Personhood

Most philosophers, courts, legislatures and legal scholars
appear to believe that a being is either a full-blown person or
not a person at all. This is what I call the "all or nothing" theory of personhood. According to this theory, an entity is considered a person only if he or she passes a particular litmus test.
Any being that fails to pass this test would automatically be
considered a non-person.
Take, for example, Markus Dubber's conception of personhood. For him, an entity is a person only if he is a human
being and is capable of autonomy. Thus, we are presented with
a stark "all-or-nothing" approach to humans that are not capable of autonomy: they are either full-fledged persons or not persons at all. Since Dubber contemplates no intermediate
options, and given that he believes that the capacity for autonomy is an essential component of personhood, he is forced to
27. Roslyn Weiss, The Perils of Personhood, 89 ETHics 66, 67-68 (1978).
28. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 37, 40
(1972).
29. Id.
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conclude that such humans should be excluded from the status
of "persons."30 The same logic leads him to reject affording personhood status to corporations and nonhuman animals. 31
State courts often adopt an all-or-nothing approach to personhood when addressing the problem of whether fetuses
should be considered persons in the constitutional sense.
Hence, most jurisdictions have concluded that fetuses should
only be considered persons postnatally. Prior to birth, however,
they are typically not considered persons at all. This, of course,
was the same approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade. 32 The dichotomous nature of this way of conceiving the
personhood of fetuses is apparent. Given that no alternative
categories of personhood are envisioned by such precedents, fetuses must either be considered full-fledged persons or total
non-persons.
B. From An "All or Nothing" Theory of Personhood to a
"Tiered" Theory of Personhood
This "all-or-nothing" approach to the personhood of fetuses
might explain why the Supreme Court balked at concluding
that fetuses were "persons" protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the Supreme Court believed that the consequences of considering the unborn to be full-blown persons for
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment would be unpalatable, it concluded that it would be prudent to treat them as nonpersons. In Roe, the Court framed the problem in the following
manner:
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither
in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or attempted
by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,
is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of
life without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the
sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of
30. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 259.
31. Id. at 218-19 (discussing the non-personhood status of corporations); id. at
258 (discussing his view of animals as non-persons).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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line with the Amendment's command? There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the typical
abortion statute. It has already been pointed out . . . that in
Texas the woman is not a principal or an accomplice with respect
to an abortion upon her. If the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice? Further, the penalty for
criminal abortion specified by Art. 1195 is significantly less than
the maximum penalty for murder prescribed by Art. 1257 of the
Texas Penal Code. If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be
33
different?
The Court's analysis would be unobjectionable if the only
option that it had available was the "all-or-nothing" determination of considering that the fetus was either a full-blown person
or a total non-person. Undoubtedly, if a fetus were considered a
full-fledged person, his killing would need to be punished as
murder, not as an abortion, for punishing the killing of some
full-blown persons less than other full-fledged persons would
certainly violate the equal protection of the laws.
What the Court failed to consider, however, was that adopting the all-or-nothing conception of personhood was not their
only available option. They could have adopted a more flexible
approach to personhood that would allow them to differentiate
between different levels or "tiers" of personhood. Under such an
approach, a born human could be considered a "first tier" person
with full Fourteenth Amendment rights, whereas an unborn fetus could be considered a "partial" or "second tier" person with
less constitutional protections.
Such a "tiered" conception of personhood has much to commend it, for it allows us to incorporate into the legal landscape
what appear to be morally relevant differences between different beings. In contrast, the rigidity of the "all-or-nothing" theory of personhood will almost inevitably lead to glossing over
many of the normatively relevant similarities and incongruities
that exist amongst the beings that could plausibly be considered
persons. Thus, as Professor Jessica Berg has recently pointed
out, questions about the rights of nonhuman entities have unfortunately been plagued by a "mistaken insistence on 'all-or-

33. Id. at 157 n.54.
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nothing' designations" of personhood that overlook the fact that
"most claims of moral status map along a continuum." 34
The tiered conception of personhood that is defended here
avoids oversimplifying the solution to cases in which it is
claimed that certain beings such as fetuses or animals should
be considered persons by recognizing that it is sometimes sensible to differentiate between kinds of persons. This flexible approach to personhood allows for the recognition of more rights
to beings that are considered full-blown persons and less rights
to entities that, although similar in some regards to full-fledged
persons, are sufficiently different from them to warrant different legal treatment.
III.
A.

Conceptions of Tiered Personhood

Natural Persons vs. JuridicalPersons

Taking a cue from Supreme Court jurisprudence, Professor
Berg proposed in a recent article that we distinguish between
the rights of natural and juridical persons. According to her
framework, a "natural person" is a an entity that is "entitled to
the maximum protection under the law." 35 This class is comprised of all post-natal human beings. 36 In contrast, a "juridical
person" is a nonhuman entity "for which society chooses to afford some of the same legal protections and rights as accorded
natural persons." 37 The paradigmatic example of a "juridical
person" is a corporation, for it enjoys some of the rights afforded
to natural persons (i.e. due process, 38 equal protection, 39 etc.)
but not others (i.e. privilege against self-incrimination 40 and
certain Fourth Amendment rights 4 1). This does not mean, however, that juridical personhood must be necessarily reserved for
corporations and similar entities. Several years ago, for example, Louisiana afforded juridical personhood status to in vitro
34. Jessica Berg, Of Elephantsand Embryos: A ProposedFramework for Legal
Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 403 (2007).

35. Id. at 373.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
39. County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

40. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
41. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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fertilized human ova. 42 Although the Louisiana statute did not
confer to such entities all of the rights that are typically afforded to natural persons, they were granted the right to sue or
be sued in state courts (i.e. standing) 4 3 and the right not to be
farmed or cultured for research or other purposes."
Although Berg believes that granting juridical personhood
to in vitro fertilized ova is injudicious, 45 she suggests that other
beings should be afforded such status either by legislative action or constitutional decision. Thus, Berg considers that sentient fetuses should be considered juridical persons with "specific,
but not complete, rights."46 Chief amongst the rights that
should be conferred to such beings would be the right to be legally protected from unjustifiable inflictions of pain. Furthermore, Berg has proposed that sentient fetuses be afforded more
rights as they approach the moment of birth47 It should be
noted that this analysis roughly maps unto the Supreme
Court's treatment of fetuses under its abortion jurisprudence,
for the constitutionally significant moment of "viability"48 is
close to the moment in which the fetus starts developing the
capacity to feel pain (i.e. sentience). 49 Consequently, sentient
fetuses usually have more constitutional protection than nonsentient fetuses. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has suggested that the interests of fetuses grow stronger as they ap50
proach the moment of birth.
The considerations that lead Berg to conclude that there
are sound reasons for treating sentient fetuses as juridical persons also lead her to claim that many nonhuman animals
should be afforded the same status. 51 Since most nonhuman animals have the capacity to feel pain, she argues that they should
42. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121, 9:123 (1999).
43. Id. § 124.
44. Id. § 122.

45. Berg, supra note 34, at 391-92.
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 399.

48. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1994).
49. Berg, supra note 34, at 393-94.
50. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 313 (1980) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162-63(1973)), for the Supreme Court's assertions that the governmental
interest in protecting the fetus "'grow[s] m substantiality as the woman approaches term.'"

51. Berg, supra note 34, at 403-05.
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have a right to be protected from the infliction of unwarranted
suffering. Berg also contends that the rights of different senti52
ent animals should "vary depending on the interests at stake."
Therefore, the fact that elephants may suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder in a way that other animals do not, might
provide us with good reasons to afford to elephants a right to be
kept free from psychological trauma while simultaneously deny53
ing such right to other creatures.
B.

Self-Conscious vs. Conscious Beings

Peter Singer believes that self-conscious beings should be
afforded more rights than the entities that he calls "conscious
being[s].'54 In general terms, a self-conscious being is an entity
that is self-aware, has a "sense of future" and "the capacity to
relate to others."55 Most humans and some animals, such as
chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans, qualify as self-conscious
beings. 56 However, newborn infants and some people with severe brain damage do not. "Conscious beings," on the other
hand, are entities who are "sentient and capable of experiencing
pleasure and pain" but are not rational and do not have selfawareness or a sense of the future.5 7 Most nonhuman animals
and some humans, such as sentient fetuses, babies and intellectually disabled people, are conscious beings.
For Singer, self-conscious beings have a more robust right
to life than merely conscious beings. 58 The reason for this difference lies partly in the fact that, since only self-conscious beings are capable of understanding that they exist over time,
killing them frustrates their desire to continue living. 59 However, since conscious beings do not have the ability to understand their continued existence, they are not capable of
harboring desires to live in the future. Therefore, causing the
death of such creatures does not frustrate a desire to continue
living. As a result, the killing of a self-conscious being is, all
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 404.
Id.
See SINGER, supra note 21, at 101.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 86-87, 101, 115-16.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 95-99.
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things being equal, a greater wrong than the killing of a con60
scious being.
This, of course, does not mean that conscious beings should
have no rights at all. Since such beings have the capacity to feel
pain, they should have a right to be protected from unjustifiable
inflictions of suffering. Furthermore, they should have a right
to life, albeit more limited than the one afforded to self-conscious beings. Therefore, although one should as a general rule
abstain from killing both types of beings, justifying causing the
death of self-conscious entities would be more difficult than justifying the killing of conscious beings.
C. A Four-Tiered Conception of Personhood: Some Concrete
Proposals
If we amalgamate the ideas of Berg and Singer, one can
surmise at least four conclusions with regards to the rights that
should attach to different entities. First, as a general rule, born
humans and other self-conscious beings should have access to
all of the rights that the legal system has to offer. Second, nonhuman sentient entities should have a right to be protected
from unjustifiable inflictions of pain in much the same way as
self-conscious beings. However, it is sensible to deny them
some rights in light of the fact that they lack a sense of self and
of the future. Thirdly, non-sentient living entities should have
different rights than beings that have the capacity to feel pain.
Lastly, the rights of non-living entities should be commensurate
with the benefits that society will reap by granting such rights.
Each of these cases warrants separate consideration.
1.

Self-Conscious Beings and the Line-Drawing Problem

There seem to be good reasons to consider that self-conscious beings should be entitled to the maximum amount of legal protection. Since most humans are self-conscious entities, it
61
makes sense to protect them more than other beings.
60. Id. at 101, 132.
61. I acknowledge that some animal law scholars may object to my proposal
because it might be interpreted as affording rights depending on the degree of similarity that exists between nonhuman creatures and human beings. See, e.g.,
Taimie Bryant, Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals Be
Like Humans to Be Legally Protectedfrom Humans?, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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It should be noted, however, that although it is true, as
Singer has argued, that some humans lack the capacity for selfconsciousness, the law could still have good reasons to afford to
those beings the same rights as it affords to self-conscious entities. The reasons for this are pragmatical in nature. It is sometimes painstakingly difficult to distinguish between selfconscious and merely conscious beings. It is equally difficult to
determine when a developing being has become self-conscious
and when a decaying entity has lost such capacity. Faced with
such difficult questions, perhaps it would be wise for the law to
adopt a bright rule of demarcation that leaves no doubt to the
citizenry with regards to the beings that should be afforded
maximum protection under the law and those that should not.
Although such line-drawing is inherently arbitrary, it is
probably less arbitrary than allowing for ad hoc case by case
determinations of self-consciousness by judges or other professionals. Ultimately, the benefit that society will reap from easily identifiable standards probably outweighs the costs that
207 (2007). Thus, it might be "prone to speciesism because it fails to validate "otherness," instead rewarding human analogs when and if they appear in other beings." Cassuto, supra note 13, at 86.
In spite of this possible criticism, the view I propose here should not be rejected as speciesist because the distinctions drawn here are not grounded on the
basis of the being belonging to a particularspecies, even if it is claimed that some
species deserve more protection than others. Ultimately, the amount of legal protection is dependent on the being's capacity for self-consciousness and awareness
of the future, not its belonging to a particular species. The fact that human beings
typically share those traits is beside the point, for what really matters are the
traits, not the species. See Singer, supra note 21, at 61 (stating that it is not
speciesist to claim that human life has more value than animal life because of the
human capacity for self-consciousness because "it is not on the basis of the species
itself that one life is held to be more valuable than another").
These traits matter because beings that are self-aware and have a sense of the
future are more prone to suffering than creatures lacking these features. Selfconscious beings, for example, fear death not only because of the possible pain that
the process of dying might cause, but also because of the suffering that having
advanced knowledge of one's demise might cause (think of the suffering of a prisoner in death row who agonizes when he contemplates his future death). Furthermore, since self-conscious beings that are aware of the passage of time make plans
for the future, killing them entails not only terminating their existence, but also
taking from them the possibility to fulfill their plans and aspirations. Killing beings lacking these characteristics does not harm them in the same way. Given
that they have no awareness of the future, they are not conscious of the significance of their death. Since they lack the ability to plan for tomorrow, they have no
sense of the momentous transience of their own existence.
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might be generated by engaging in a more nuanced and flexible
approach to these issues. As a result, I propose that full legal
protection be afforded to all human beings after birth,62 regardless of whether they are individually capable of self-consciousness. Furthermore, I propose that the same status be afforded
to all great apes, for the scientific evidence demonstrates that
such beings are as a general rule capable of self-awareness and
63
rationality.
2.

Sentient Beings

There appear to be sound reasons to afford to other sentient
beings some rights, albeit less than those granted to the abovementioned entities. This category of beings should be comprised
of sentient fetuses and sentient animals. Since these beings
have the capacity to feel pain, they should, at a minimum, be
legally protected from the unwarranted infliction of suffering.
In the case of fetuses, this should lead to making sure that abortions, even when they are necessary, be carried out as painlessly for the fetus as possible. As Singer has pointed out, this
is an issue that does not usually receive the attention that it
64
deserves.
Serious consideration should also be given to affording to
sentient fetuses and animals standing to sue, for this is the only
62. I realize that it is somewhat arbitrary to exclude some developed fetuses
from this category. This is a product of the line-drawing problems of the law. This
decision, however, is probably justified, for, as Professor Berg has argued:
The concern is not with determining at what point the fetus develops
any interests, but at what point those interests should form the basis of
legal personhood. This is a question of line drawing-legal personhood
must come into play at some point in time even though fetal interests likely
develop along a continuum. The law is a rather blunt instrument. Although
there may be a way to achieve a somewhat nuanced legal approach by recognizing juridical personhood at an early stage of fetal development, and subsequently natural personhood at a later stage, both designations still must
be based on fairly easily identifiable standards-in other words, we must
still draw lines. The final determination of whether and how to draw distinctions between different developmental levels of human beings may depend on practical needs in identifying clear legal lines.
Berg, supra note 34, at 393.
63. See authorities cited in SINGER, supra note 21, at 110-18, for a discussion
of the scientific evidence showing that all great apes are capable of self-awareness
and rationality.
64. SINGER, supra note 21, at 151.

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:759

meaningful way in which one can secure that their (limited)
rights will be fully vindicated. On the other hand, in light of the
arguments advanced in the previous subsection, they should
not have such a robust right to life as born humans do. Thus,
although conscious beings should have a prima facie right to
live, justifying causing their death should be less difficult than
justifying causing the death of born humans.
3.

Non-Sentient Living Creatures

There might be considerations that justify affording distinct rights to certain non-sentient living entities such as embryos and some fetuses. Embryos and non-sentient fetuses are
considerably different from born humans and other sentient beings, for, unlike most humans, they do not have the capacity to
understand their continued existence, and, unlike sentient fetuses and most animals, they cannot feel pain. As a result, it is
sensible to afford to such creatures significantly less rights than
the ones granted to humans, sentient fetuses, and animals.
However, embryos and non-sentient fetuses could be provided
with a limited set of rights in light of their potential for eventually developing consciousness and self-consciousness. This is
what Louisiana has done in the case of in vitro fertilized ova.
4.

Non-Living Entities

Non-living entities, such as corporations, should be afforded rights insofar as doing so promotes societal interests. By
the same token, their rights should be curtailed when it is in
the interests of society to do so. Therefore, unlike with other
entities, the degree of legal protection afforded to corporations
should depend on whether conferring such protection would be
advantageous for the citizenry, not on the similarities or differences that exist between a corporate entity and sentient and
self-conscious beings. Furthermore, corporations should, as a
general rule, be afforded fewer rights than those granted to
born humans, for one must not forget that corporate beings exist to help humans achieve their goals, not the other way
around.
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Summary: Four Tiers of Personhood

In light of the aforementioned considerations, I propose a
four-tiered approach to legal personhood. First tier persons
should have access to all of the rights that the law has to offer.
This category of personhood should be reserved for born human
beings and the great apes. If there is conclusive scientific evidence that suggests that other nonhuman animal species have
the capacity to be self-conscious, then we should consider extending the protections of first-tier personhood to them as well.
On the other hand, second tier persons should have access
to some, but not all, statutory and constitutional rights. At a
minimum, they should have a right to be kept free from unjustifiable inflictions of harm and perhaps they should have standing to sue in order to vindicate their legally recognized
interests. Furthermore, they should have some right to life, albeit not as strong as the one afforded to first tier persons. This
category of personhood should include sentient fetuses and
most nonhuman animals.
There might be considerations that lead society to create
additional tiers of personhood. In this vein, embryos and nonsentient fetuses might be treated as third tier persons. Regardless of the legal protection that we decide to provide to such beings, they should have significantly less rights than either first
or second tier persons.
A fourth tier of personhood might be created to deal with
the legal status of non-living entities that exist in order to further human interests. Corporations are the paradigmatic instances of these types of beings. The rights of such entities can
be expanded or restricted depending on whether doing so is beneficial for society.
Finally, it should be noted that discriminating between persons on the basis of the tier of personhood that they belong to
does not violate basic principles of equality, for there are normatively relevant differences between the members of the various tiers. Such differences justify affording differentiated legal
treatment to beings depending on the tier that they belong to.
Thus, adoption of the tiered conception of personhood proposed
here would have avoided the "dilemma" that the Supreme Court
identified in Roe v. Wade with regards to the legal status of fetuses. If one conceives of fetuses as second-tier persons and
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born humans as first tier persons, there would be nothing perplexing in treating such entities differently. There would also
be no impediment to affording to fetuses some due process
rights, albeit less than those afforded to humans.
IV.

Tiered Personhood and Victimhood

The tiered conception of personhood is helpful for answering questions with regards to who should count as a victim for
the criminal law. It may also be helpful in determining the
rights that should be afforded to different victims. It has been
frequently asserted that a victim is a "person" that has been
65
harmed by a crime.
The problem with this definition is that it is plagued by ambiguity, for "personhood" is an inherently hazy concept. Thus,
the question about who should qualify as a person that can be
wronged by a crime is left unanswered. Furthermore, as I have
attempted to demonstrate here, the issue with regards to who
should count as a person is normative, not definitional or conceptual. Consequently, the relative merits of alternative definitions of victimhood should be gauged by their normative appeal
rather than by their compatibility with an a priori definition of
personhood.
Ultimately, questions about who should qualify as a victim
are inextricably linked to questions about which entities should
have rights whose protection it would make sense to secure by
way of the criminal law. Such questions cannot be answered
without a theory about personhood and about the rights that
should attach to different beings. The tiered conception of personhood advanced here constitutes one such theory. According
to this theory, first tier persons should have access to all of the
rights that our legal system has to offer. Thus, it would be perfectly sensible for society to protect the rights of first tier persons by way of the criminal law. As a result, born humans and
certain animals capable of self-consciousness should undeniably
qualify as candidates for victimhood.
Second tier persons should have access to some legal protections, but not all. More specifically, since the constitutive feature of second tier persons is their capacity to suffer, they
65. See generally DUBBER, supra note 8.
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should have a right to be kept free from unjustifiable inflictions
of pain. If this is the case, I see no reason why we should abstain from making use of the criminal law as a vehicle for safeguarding such interests. As I have argued elsewhere, anticruelty offenses were primarily enacted for the purpose of
avoiding the suffering of sentient animals. 66 This strikes me as
a perfectly legitimate use of the criminal sanction. Since the
animals protected by these statutes are sentient creatures, inflicting pain on such creatures can plausibly be characterized as
legally relevant harm. If so, there should be no impediment to
treating sentient animals as the true victims of such offenses.
The same can be said of sentient fetuses. Their capacity to feel
pain provides us with sound reasons to afford them rights to be
kept free from unwarranted suffering. Thus, safeguarding such
interests by way of the criminal law is perfectly sensible.
As has been mentioned, however, first tier and second tier
persons warrant distinct legal treatment in light of their differences. Thus, it makes sense for the criminal law to protect the
former type of person more than the latter. The morally relevant differences between first and second tier persons might explain, for example, why murder is almost universally punished
more severely than abortion and animal cruelty. Furthermore,
it might also explain why harm to human interests is criminalized much more frequently and pervasively than harm to nonhuman animals.
The case in favor of treating third tier persons such as embryos and non-sentient fetuses as victims is much weaker.
Since such beings do not have the capacity for consciousness
and sentience, it is doubtful that they have an interest in not
being injured or destroyed. Therefore, criminal laws that protect non-sentient entities are more appropriately conceived as
statutes that further a goal that is independent of safeguarding
whatever interest, if any, such beings might have in being kept
free from injury. As a result, third tier persons do not constitute adequate candidates for victimhood. The real victim in
cases of injury to non-sentient beings, if there is one, would be
66. Luis E. Chiesa, Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish? - Harm, Victimhood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 Miss. L.J. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104494.
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the first or second tier person whose interests are harmed by
the injury or destruction of the third tier person.
Lastly, whether fourth tier persons such as corporations
should be treated as victims is unclear. Although I am not sure
what the right answer is to this question, I think that it should
depend on whether society would benefit by protecting the corporation as a victim regardless of whether the individuals who
have ties to the entity have suffered harm. In an article published in this symposium issue, Professor G6mez-Jara Dfez has
argued that they should. 67 If he is right, then it could plausibly
be contended that corporations should be considered candidates
for victimhood. In any case, the matter is debatable.
In sum, I believe that the tiered conception of personhood
defended here provides us with a vehicle to better tackle the
difficult question about who should be counted as a victim.
Many people believe that only "persons" can qualify as victims.
Given the vague nature of the concept of personhood, such an
answer is unsatisfying. If by such an assertion it is meant that
only humans should qualify as victims, then I believe that it is
mistaken. Sentient fetuses and most nonhuman animals have
interests that may be vindicated by making use of the criminal
sanction. Ultimately, I have no problem with claiming that only
persons can be considered victims, as long as it is made clear
that use of the term "person" in this context includes both first
and second tier persons.
Michael Vick's Dogs: A Second Look
At the outset of this article it was stated that the most telling aspect of Michael Vick's case was that he was ordered to pay
one million dollars in restitution to ensure that the dogs that he
had harmed as a result of his illegal operation were properly
cared for. The reason why this feature of the case is of significance is because it reveals what I believe is an irreversible tendency towards a more nuanced approach to questions about
personhood and victimhood. By ordering that restitution be
paid in this case, the trial court implicitly rejected the notion
that humanhood should be a prerequisite for being considered
67. Carlos G6mez-Jara Diez, Corporationsas the Victims of Mismanagement:
Beyond the Shareholders vs. Managers Debate, 28 PACE L. REV. 795 (2008).
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either a victim or a person. Furthermore, by directing that the
money be used to enhance the quality of life of the dogs, the
District Court was also tacitly recognizing that nonhuman animals have a legally cognizable interest in living as free from
suffering as possible. This interest, of course, stems from their
sentience.
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to believe that the
Court's ruling necessarily entails that nonhuman animals are
as much legal persons as humans are. The Court's decision
should be understood for what it is: an express recognition that
sentience is a sufficient condition for access to some of the protections that the legal system has to offer: victimhood status
and candidacy for restitution. Therefore, as far as the judge
presiding over the Vick case was concerned, second tier persons
should qualify as victims. Some might find this conclusion disappointing. I, on the other hand, find it unassailable.

